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Abstract 
Purpose. Challenging the static view of family business governance, we propose a model of 
owner-manager relationships derived from the configurational analysis of managerial behavior and 
change in governance structure. 
Design/methodology/approach. Stemming from social exchange theory and building on the 4C 
model proposed by Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005), we consider the evolving owner-manager 
relationship in four main configurations. On the one hand, we account for family businesses 
shifting from a generalized to a restricted exchange system, and vice versa, according to whether 
a family manager misbehaves in a stewardship-oriented governance structure or a nonfamily 
manager succeeds in building a trusting relationship in an agency-oriented governance structure. 
On the other hand, we consider that family firms will strengthen a generalized exchange system, 
rather than a restricted one, according to whether a family manager contributes to the stewardship-
oriented culture in the business or a nonfamily manager proves to be driven by extrinsic rewards. 
Four scenarios are analyzed in terms of the managerial behavior and governance structure that 
characterize the phases of the relationship between owners and managers. 
Findings. Various factors trigger managerial behavior, making the firm deviate from or further 
build on what is assumed by stewardship and agency theories (i.e., pro-organizational versus 
opportunistic behavior, respectively), which determine the governance structure over time. 
Workplace deviance, asymmetric altruism, and patriarchy on the one hand, and pro-organizational 
behavior, relationship building and long-term commitment on the other, are found to determine 
how the manager behaves and thus characterize the owner’s reactions in terms of governance 
mechanisms. This enables us to present a dynamic view of governance structures, which adapt to 
the actual attitudes and behaviors of employed managers. 
Research implications. As time is a relevant dimension affecting individual behavior and 
triggering change in an organization, one must consider family business governance as being 
dynamic in nature. Moreover, it is not family membership that determines the most appropriate 
governance structure, but the owner-manager relationship that evolves over time, thus contributing 
to the 4C model. 
Originality/value. The proposed model integrates social exchange theory and the 4C model to 
predict changes in governance structure, as summarized in the final framework we propose. 
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More than ever, businesses and business owners depend on the innovative power of their 
employees, and there is never a one-size-fits-all solution regarding the most suitable governance 
structure to unlock their full potential (e.g., Bammens, Notelaers, & Van Gils, 2015). Hence, 
currently challenges call for a new and more thorough understanding of governance mechanisms. 
In particular, the relationship between the owning family and the family business managers – 
family or nonfamily – is a key success factor in innovation-driven transformations, which begin 
with the commitment of the owning family. However, static structures do not fully capture the 
governance needs of family firms today (e.g., Lubatkin, Lane, Collin, & Very, 2007). A dynamic 
view is necessary to grasp the essence of modern owner-manager relationships and has 
implications on how to structure sound family firm governance for today’s and tomorrow’s 
challenges (e.g., Lambrecht, 2005).  
Family firm governance has been a focus of investigation in the research field of family 
business (Madison, Holt, Kellermanns, & Ranft, 2016). Thus far, several issues have been 
discussed regarding boards of directors (Bammens, Voordeckers, & Van Gils, 2008; Walther, 
Calabrò, & Morner, 2017) and their composition as predictors of family business survival (Wilson, 
Wright, & Scholes, 2013), shareholders’ interest protection, or managerial entrenchment (Deman, 
Jorissen, & Laveren, 2018) in order to understand how family firms differ from their nonfamily 
peers (Siebels & zu Knyphausen‐Aufseß, 2012) and how governance mechanisms vary across 
different family businesses (Nordqvist, Sharma, & Chirico, 2014). These research contributions 
have been primarily built upon agency and stewardship theory, juxtaposing them and offering a 
rather static view of family business governance and behavior (Madison et al., 2016). Indeed, 
although advancing our understanding of family and nonfamily governance, contributions rooted 
in agency theory have revealed the sources of agency problems specific to family firms, and the 
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incentive systems, monitoring mechanisms and conflict management tools to deal with them. For 
instance, Schulze and colleagues (2003a, 2003b; 2001) mainly discuss the negative consequences 
of altruism; Morck and Yeung (2003) offer a broad view on the entrenchment effects and 
expropriation opportunities related to the presence of family members in the company; and De 
Massis, Kotlar, Mazzola, Minola, and Sciascia (2018) analyze agency problems related to the 
multiple goals of family business owners leading to conflicting selves. On the other hand, also 
leveraging stewardship theory, scholars have theorized family firms and advanced our 
understanding of governance in this context. Indeed, Eddleston and Kellermanns (2007) 
investigate productive family relationships, showing the positive effect of conflict in some family 
firms; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, and Scholnick (2008) highlight the relevance for family firms of 
ensuring the continuity of the business, nurturing a community of employees, and seeking closer 
connections with customers to sustain the business; and Davis, Allen, and Hayes (2010) discuss 
the role of trust and commitment to family values that make family and nonfamily employees in 
the business perceive stewardship in the organization. In line with this contribution, a stewardship 
climate scale has been developed specifically to evaluate to what extent the governance of a family 
business is oriented toward stewardship (Neubaum, Thomas, Dibrell, & Craig, 2017). 
Theoretical perspectives on agency and stewardship differ primarily in their underlying 
assumption about managers’ behaviors, which in turn affects their relationship with firm owners, 
i.e., principals. Agency theory applies the economic model of man, assuming an agent 
opportunistically maximizing hisi personal wealth (Fama, 1980). Asymmetric information and 
separation of ownership and control determine the misalignment of interests between owners and 
managers. Conflicting objectives can be addressed through specific governance structures and 
mechanisms that, although representing agency costs for the firm, ensure the owners’ wealth 
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maximization (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This is opposed by the pro-organizational and 
collectivistic view of intrinsically motivated individuals assumed in stewardship theory (Davis, 
Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). Stewards behave in perfect alignment with the shareholders’ 
interests, as they believe they will be rewarded for their commitment and effort toward wealth 
maximization. Altruistic and trustful relationships determine a governance system characterized 
by high involvement and collectivism at all organizational levels (Hernandez, 2012). Thus, we 
claim that a focus on the relationships between owners and managers over time can contribute to 
this debate. Relying on either theory to investigate the owner-manager relationship enables one to 
focus on specific governance mechanisms installed to define the relationship between a manager 
and the assets he controls on the owners’ behalf (Davis et al., 1997; James, Jennings, & Jennings, 
2017).  
Along the continuum between agency and stewardship theory predictions, family businesses 
represent a highly relevant case to investigate as, when family members are active in management, 
their firms encounter the unique challenge of familial relationships between owners and managers 
(McGivern, 1978). According to management composition and in particular examining the family 
membership of the CEO, prominent studies in the field assume agency-oriented governance for 
nonfamily managers and stewardship-oriented governance for family managers (Madison et al., 
2016). They assume, in particular, that nonfamily managers’ personal goals must be aligned with 
those of the organization, whereas the family manager’s interests are instinctively aligned through 
family affiliation (Chung & Yuen, 2003; James et al., 2017). However, recent studies have found 
no empirical evidence of this bifurcation bias, but rather observed nonfamily managers striving in 
a stewardship-oriented governance structure (James et al., 2017; Verbeke & Kano, 2012). 
Interestingly, little is known about the drivers of the choice of either agency-oriented or 
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stewardship-oriented governance in family firms, in concert with the appointment of either a 
family or a nonfamily manager. We claim this to be relevant, as empirical evidence in nonfamily 
contexts shows that managers make different decisions in an agency-oriented setting than in a 
stewardship-oriented governance structure (Tosi, Brownlee, Silva, & Katz, 2003).  
Our conceptual paper attempts to challenge the dominant view of an organization’s 
governance structures as static (Madison et al., 2016). Only if governance structures are 
understood as a continuum can business owners design the relationship with their managers in a 
way that suits the challenges of the modern age. The key tenet of our analysis is the idea that 
individual attitudes and behaviors as well as relationships are subject to change over time 
(Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). Thus, we embrace a dynamic perspective on family business 
governance and managerial behavior (Lubatkin et al., 2007). Our aim is to identify triggers of 
change at the individual level to show how they affect 1) the owner-manager relationship and 2) 
the governance structure regulating that relationship. To this end, we borrow from Social Exchange 
Theory (SET) and the 4C model to understand how command, connection, continuity, and 
community characterize the relationships between owners and managers. Our findings contribute 
to the debate on managerial behaviors, owners’ reactions, and governance mechanisms as subject 
to change over time (Lubatkin et al., 2007). By building on SET, we claim that a focus on owner-
manager relationships (Daspit, Holt, Chrisman, & Long, 2016; Long & Mathews, 2011) can 
predict changes in individual behavior and governance structures along the continuum of agency 
and stewardship behaviors. Using this more thorough understanding of governance structures in 
family firms, we enable business owners to design their governance structures to foster the 
necessary flexibility to fully unlock innovative potential – without governance restraints. 
2. Theoretical framework 
6 
 
2.1 Agency and stewardship governance in family firms 
Classical agency governance contains control mechanisms that reduce agency problems (e.g., 
information asymmetries) in the owner-agent relationship and incentivize goal alignment (e.g., 
performance-based pay) (Madison et al., 2016). It assumes an opportunistic agent following self-
serving interests. In contrast to this view, stewardship theory assumes a manager (steward) 
axiomatically aligning his interests with those of the firm, hence the owners (Davis et al., 1997), 
as he is intrinsically motivated. As the owner-steward relationship is based on trust, control 
mechanisms become expendable (Davis et al., 1997). Family firms in particular benefit from 
stewardship-oriented governance characterized by trust and commitment among family members 
(Corbetta & Salvato, 2004), fostered in particular by their “thick” blood ties (Davis et al., 2010). 
Nevertheless, family firm principals often neglect the necessity of well-grounded 
governance structures, presumably due to the overlap of ownership and control, thus diminishing 
diverging interests and information asymmetries (James et al., 2017). This misapprehension is 
rooted in early theoretical studies on agency that suggested governance structures serve to protect 
shareholders’ interests in the event of separation of ownership and control (Fama, 1980) – a 
condition absent in family firms. However, research has shown that family firms also require a 
sophisticated governance structure to serve the owners’ interests (Schulze et al., 2003b). 
Remarkable efforts in researching governance mechanisms in family firms have discovered so-
called nontraditional agency problems unique to family firms (e.g., asymmetric altruism and 
managerial entrenchment) (e.g., Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Eddleston & Kidwell, 2012; Zahra, 
2007).  Despite contradicting findings related to governance structures in management research, 
family firm literature reveals clear trends. Stewardship governance is common for family members 
in management positions, whereas nonfamily managers are often closely monitored and explicitly 
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incentivized – thus operating under agency-oriented governance (James et al., 2017). This 
bifurcation bias is rooted in the natural preference toward family members as opposed to nonfamily 
members (Verbeke & Kano, 2012). In particular, the debate over the effectiveness of aligning 
interests in opposing governance structures has revived this discussion (James et al., 2017). The 
distinct characteristics of managers in family firms and their likelihood of behaving as 
agents/stewards are at the core of this debate. The prevalent belief in the mutual exclusivity of 
these two theoretical approaches to governance barely captures reality. Not only can both 
approaches coexist in the same firm, but they are also subject to change. These changes often 
unfold over time due to the concentration of family ownership, personal relationships between 
owners and managers, lengthy managerial tenures and transgenerational orientation (Chua, 
Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999).  
 
2.2 Exchange relationships 
The focus on dyadic relationships is rooted in Social Exchange Theory (SET), a theory that 
suggests owner-manager relationships are characterized either by a generalized exchange system 
(GES) or by a restricted exchange system (RES). The former is associated with the owner-family 
manager relationship and espouses the premises of stewardship-oriented governance. The latter 
relates to the owner-nonfamily manager relationship, which is grounded in an agency-oriented 
governance structure (Daspit et al., 2016). SET has already found fertile ground in the family 
business context in analyses of relationships among family members and between family and 
nonfamily members with regard to succession (Daspit et al., 2016). A key aspect distinguishing 
GES and RES is temporality, as repeated exchanges over time nurture trust, obligations, and 




Theoretical frameworks distinguish between two basic forms of relationships: communal and 
exchange relationships (Clark & Mils, 1993). The business literature is mainly concerned with 
exchange relationships, as they rely on expectations of beneficial reciprocity, which adequately 
describe the relationships relevant to organizations. For the purpose of this article, we focus solely 
on these exchange relationships and use SET to explain interactions among individuals and groups. 
SET – among the most influential perspectives from which to investigate workplace behavior – 
deals with social exchange relationships that “involve a series of interactions that generate 
obligations” (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005, p. 874) and are often the result of trust in future 
reciprocity (Blau, 1964). Thus, it has also been used to study relationships in family firms (e.g., 
Barnett, Long, & Marler, 2012; Daspit et al., 2016; Long, 2011).  
SET describes a relationship as a series of interactions that are interdependent on the actions 
of another person (Blau, 1964). Social interactions can occur over an extended period of time and 
reciprocal benefits can be delayed. Hence, social exchange relationships are based on direct as 
well as indirect reciprocity (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). To further distinguish direct from 
indirect reciprocity in relationship exchanges, we differentiate between restricted and generalized 
exchange systems, although they form the two ends of a continuum (Long & Mathews, 2011).  
Restricted exchange systems (RES) mainly contain actions of direct reciprocity. Thus, 
individuals expect an immediate return of comparable benefits for their actions (Cropanzano & 
Mitchell, 2005). These interactions are typically self-interested and self-serving at both ends, hence 
mutually beneficial for certain ends and are “characterized by a high level of individualism, 
competition, impersonality and contractualism” (Long & Mathews, 2011, p. 290). Agency theory 
relies heavily on this form of exchange by assuming the agent is entering into a contract with the 
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principal to maximize personal benefits (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The second distinct form is 
the generalized exchange system (GES) characterized by interactions that require no direct or 
immediate returns of comparable benefits (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). GES is mainly found 
in long-term relationships, not only among individuals but also in groups where a direct exchange 
of comparable benefits is not feasible. Goals in family firms are often long-term and not directly 
attributable to an individual (Long & Mathews, 2011). Thus, GES are commonly associated with 
cooperation and collectivism, and require trust between both parties in the exchange. Stewardship 
theory relies heavily on this form of exchange relationships (Davis et al., 1997). A clear distinction 
is seldom possible and owner-manager relationships in particular exhibit elements of both. The 
extent to which a relationship is characterized by one or the other is the result of social construction 
and negotiations between the exchange parties (Long & Mathews, 2011).  
 
2.3 The 4C model 
How relationships unfold depends on managerial behaviors and organizational responses in terms 
of governance mechanisms that are installed to ensure that organizational goals are achieved. The 
behaviors that could trigger a change in the organization or strengthen the existing dynamics and 
mechanisms can be framed according to the 4C model (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005), 
considering the agent-like and steward-like behaviors of managers in light of the command-
connection-continuity-community dimensions. The model was developed by examining 
successful and unsuccessful family enterprises and suggests that a family business is prosperous 
over time, depending on its ability to manage those four priorities. Thus, command refers to the 
freedom to make courageous and adaptive decisions for the viability of the business; connection 
entails the ability to develop and maintain lasting, win-win relationships; continuity refers to the 
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pursuit of an enduring and substantive mission; and community relates to the ability to nurture a 
cohesive and caring culture (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005).  
These dimensions incorporate temporal considerations, which are especially crucial when 
analyzing human behavior and relationships (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2014; Sharma, Salvato, 
& Reay, 2014), forming basis of examining governance changes in family firms. Time appears in 
many different aspects relevant to family firms, such as history, familial tradition, 
transgenerational thinking, or employee tenure (Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011). To capture these 
various facets of time, a long-term orientation is acknowledged, in order to account for the effect 
of family business characteristics on decision making, at both the individual and the organizational 
level (Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011). First, regarding command, we consider two possible 
managerial behaviors. On the one hand, managers can show work deviance behaviors, thus eluding 
extant control and monitoring mechanisms. On the other hand, they might show pro-
organizational behaviors, being inwardly incentivized to maximize the firm’s wealth, thus 
espousing the family’s goals in pursuit of a sustainable business for future generations (Davis et 
al., 2010). Second, the emphasis on connections might be reflected in two behavioral traits. 
Managers might perceive asymmetric altruism (Schulze et al., 2003b) and thus either identify 
opportunities to expropriate wealth from the business, because they may feel disadvantaged in 
terms of career opportunities with respect to other siblings, when they are family members, or to 
family members, when they do not belong to the family (Verbeke & Kano, 2012). However, on 
the other hand, managers might engage in relationship building, getting involved in goal setting 
and pursuit with the family owners and engendering or strengthening a trustful relationship. Third, 
managerial behaviors are consistent with the organizational and cultural traits relating to 
continuity. Indeed, on the one hand, patriarchy is acknowledged as a possible setting 
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characterizing a very hierarchical and rule-based cultural trait of the organization, which could 
manifest, for example, in primogeniture. Thus, patriarchal leadership might send a message that 
could be interpreted as parental devaluation, path-dependency and inertia to change, thus providing 
ample room to strengthen agent-like behaviors. On the other hand, the organization might be 
characterized by long-term commitment, thus leading managers to plan and implement best 
practices for the long run. This forward-looking attitude would entail a stronger steward-like 
behavior in the case of family managers, and a shift toward stewardship if the manager who 
displays this long-term commitment is a nonfamily member. 
Overall, these change factors, framed in terms of command, connections, and continuity, 
would have an effect on the community dimension, in terms of the reaction of family owners in 
adapting the governance structure and mechanisms that could function most effectively in the 
family business.  
In sum, command, connection, and continuity in family firms capture their members’ 
mindset and thinking as part of the family firm’s DNA. Hence, the community dimension is 
mirrored in the governance structures, thus affecting the family business’s durability (Madison et 
al., 2016).  
 
3. Governance structure changes in family firms 
Given the focus on the relationship between shareholders and managers in defining the prevalence 
of an agency- and stewardship-oriented governance structure (Davis et al., 1997; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976), whether or not a family firm manager is a family member will most likely be 
decisive for the initial governance structure the owning family installs (Madison et al., 2016). We 
define family manager in the following analysis as a family member who is the manager of the 
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family firm but who does not yet have ownership (Chrisman, Chua, Kellermanns, & Chang, 2007). 
The literature clearly anticipates stewardship-oriented governance for a case involving goal 
alignment and intrinsic motivation driven by family membership (Verbeke & Kano, 2012). A 
nonfamily manager is at first likely perceived as a self-interested agent in need of an agency-
oriented governance structure (Madison et al., 2016). We argue that this initial owner-manager 
relationship is subject to change, as relationships develop over time as a result of interactions and 
shared experiences.  
Defining a firm’s governance mechanism “as a dynamic ecological process that takes place 
at multiple levels of analysis within firms, involves multidirectional causalities and is path and 
history dependent—a ‘co-evolutionary process’” (Lubatkin et al., 2007, p. 47), we shed light on 
the dynamic nature of family business governance and managerial behavior by observing specific 
processes that feature dyadic relationships in family firms. To this end, we consider two scenarios 
for our analysis, an owner-family manager relationship and an owner-nonfamily manager one, to 
analyze change factors characterizing managerial behavior and affecting the respective family 
businesses’ governance structures in a 2 by 2 matrix. As mentioned above, on the one hand, 
workplace deviance, asymmetric altruism, and patriarchy make a family manager misuse the 
owners’ trust implied in stewardship-oriented governance or a nonfamily manager exploit the 
chances to gain an extra reward in an opportunistic way. Consequently, the altered relationship 
results in changes in the governance structure, incorporating or strengthening agency-oriented 
governance mechanisms that allow the owner to monitor the manager’s actions to prevent 
managerial opportunistic behavior in the future. On the other hand, pro-organizational behavior, 
relationship building, especially within the family, and long-term commitment trigger relational 
changes between owner and manager. In the latter case, we theorize either a change from agency 
13 
 
toward stewardship orientation over time, with a decreased need to install control mechanisms and 
incentive systems to monitor the agent and align his interests to the owner’s, or to reinforce 
stewardship mechanisms when a family member is intrinsically motivated and aligned with the 
goals of the family. 
To this end, we have constructed four situations to illustrate our analysis and develop an 
overarching model for changes in owner-manager relationships and corresponding governance 
structures. Our analysis is based on the concept of restricted versus general exchange to 
differentiate family and nonfamily managers’ relationships with the family owner and accounts 
for family firms’ long-term orientation. The scenarios are structured as follows: we consider an 
owner-founder of a family firm who passes on the firm’s management to either a family member 
– a family manager – (Scenario 1) or a nonfamily manager (Scenario 2) and design the governance 
structure accordingly. We stress explicitly at this point that our analysis focuses on the period after 
the management position has been transferred rather than the transition process itself. Additionally, 
we assume a stewardship-oriented governance structure to be more beneficial for family firms – 
irrespective of the manager being family or nonfamily – as it does not impose agency costs (e.g., 
monitoring efforts) and to be more suitable to the family firm’s long-term orientation (James et 
al., 2017). We analyze both scenarios using a three-phase approach. First, during the setup phase, 
the governance structure is designed based on the exchange relationship between owner and 
manager. Second, the action phase describes the influence of command, connections, and 
continuity on the relationship, assuming only one change factor at the time with all other conditions 
being equal, to properly discuss the effect of each individual trigger. Third, the change phase 
demonstrates how these relational changes manifest in the governance structure, thus exemplifying 




3.1 Scenario 1: the family manager  
The first scenario analyzes the relationship of the owner-founder and the family manager after the 
management transition is completed. For the sake of clarity, we choose the son as the new family 
manager, but it could be any family member of the owner-founder. 
Set-up phase: Familial relations are best described by GES as being characterized by a high 
level of trust and no expectations of reciprocity. The owner chooses stewardship-oriented 
governance, as he naturally refrains from monitoring/controlling family members. They are 
assumed to act pro-organizationally and serve the family legacy with no need of further goal 
alignment (Madison et al., 2016). Stewardship-oriented governance fosters the competitive 
advantage of family firms, as it allows faster decision-making and promotes long-term planning 
(Davis et al., 2010). In addition, from the son’s perspective a stewardship-oriented governance 
structure is most suitable. Indeed, the manager identifies with the family firm and ties his personal 
satisfaction and reputation to it (Madison et al., 2016). Thus, he is intrinsically motivated to 
achieve high performance (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). Accordingly, we assume that both will 
agree on a stewardship-oriented governance structure (Pieper et al., 2008).  
Action phase: We consider the command, connection and continuity dimensions to be 
triggers for change in this first scenario, namely, workplace deviance, asymmetric altruism, and 
patriarchy. The first trigger is asymmetric altruism. The concept has strongly influenced the debate 
on nontraditional agency conflicts in family firms and basically describes parental altruism being 
greater than that of their children (Schulze et al., 2001). This asymmetry – only possible in a GES 
– leads parents to overestimate the abilities and skills of their children, not adequately judging their 
motivation and ethics (Eddleston & Kidwell, 2012). The son in our scenario may embrace different 
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interests and future outlooks than his father. Asymmetric altruism leads to an inadequate level of 
control of his actions and a very limited ability for self-control (Chua, Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009). 
This freedom triggers shirking, free-riding and other self-interested actions (Schulze et al., 2001). 
Major problems that arise include the difficult enforcement of implicit and explicit contracts 
between father and son, if the latter engages in opportunistic behavior, and embellished evaluations 
due to the father’s overestimation of his son’s capabilities and actions (Chua et al., 2009; Eddleston 
& Kidwell, 2012).  
The second factor triggering a change in the owner-manager relationship is workplace 
deviance. The concept describes voluntary behavior that significantly violates organizational 
norms, thus threatening the well-being of the organization and its members (Eddleston & Kidwell, 
2012). Workplace deviance at the management level may lead to performance decreases and cause 
business failure. It comprises free-riding, lying, insubordination, sabotage, abuse of privilege, 
harassment, theft, and lack of regard for cost control (Eddleston & Kidwell, 2012). In the context 
of family firms, workplace deviance has received special attention with regard to leadership 
succession among family members. Roles are often not clearly defined and the boundaries between 
work and private life are blurry at best. Further, parents find it difficult to punish their children for 
deviant behavior, as this might threaten the family harmony (Eddleston & Kidwell, 2012). 
Asymmetric altruism and workplace deviance in a stewardship-oriented governance structure 
induce a high likelihood of the son engaging in self-serving behavior, damaging the family firm 
over an extended period of time without being adequately punished. On the one hand, the father 
trusts his son and his abilities, and refrains from closely intervening in his actions. On the other 
hand, stewardship-oriented governance does not allow for close monitoring. Eventually, the father 
will detect the deviant behaviors and negative consequences on firm performance, thus severely 
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damaging the father-son and owner-manager relationship. However, in accordance with LTO, to 
protect the family legacy over generations, the family firm omits the option of replacing the son 
as family manager to avoid reputational losses (Le Breton‐Miller & Miller, 2006). To summarize, 
the problems caused by asymmetric altruism and workplace deviance are the misalignment of 
goals between owner and manager, the problem of self-control, opportunistic behavior and a lack 
of control mechanisms to detect such behavior.  
The third change factor in this scenario is patriarchy, which describes the inability of the 
father to accept his retirement as leader and allow his son to be in charge of the family firm. In the 
founder generation in particular, this phenomenon is widespread, as the founder’s personal identity 
is directly tied to the firm (Sonnenfeld & Spence, 1989). Transferring leadership to the next 
generation causes an identity crisis in the previous incumbent. The fear of losing the family’s 
legacy and the frustration of not being able to fulfill future outlooks threatens the professional and 
personal father-son relationship (Sonnenfeld & Spence, 1989). The father is at risk of constantly 
interfering with his son’s decisions, especially outside the business context, as the stewardship-
oriented governance structure does not officially allow him to monitor his son’s actions. However, 
he uses the familial relation with the manager to discuss, control and interfere with decisions (Cater 
& Kidwell, 2014). The son in turn feels overly supervised, distrusted, and constrained in his 
decision-making. This creates conflict in the owner-manager relationship. The father suspects his 
son of making fatal business decisions and tries to intervene, while the son feels controlled and 
consequently tries to hide his actions (Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 2003). This high level of 
mistrust and interventions leads to firm-damaging behavior. To summarize, we have an owner 
with an excessive need for control and a family manager who feels distrusted and patronized. 
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Nevertheless, when the managers do not perceive problems related to asymmetric altruism, 
as they have the same opportunities as any other sibling, family managers show pro-organizational 
behavior, further engaging in GES and aiming to pursue family goals without any hindrance. 
Generalized exchange between owners and family members would also be strengthened by the 
absence of an incentive to deviate from a continuous trust building within the family, as well as 
by the lack of patriarchal culture in the organization. 
Change phase: The above-described behaviors are factors that alter the owner-manager 
relationship. As the father-son relationship is characterized by a GES, we assume that a 
stewardship governance structure was installed prior to the behaviors examined above (Madison 
et al., 2016). We theorize a change in governance toward either shifting to an agency-oriented 
structure or strengthening a stewardship-oriented structure. On the one hand, asymmetric altruism 
and workplace deviance cause a misalignment of goals between owner and manager exacerbated 
by the problem of self-control and opportunistic behavior. Moreover, patriarchy undermines the 
trust-based stewardship governance structure. Replacing an appointed family manager is highly 
unlikely. As the identified factors are nonetheless damaging for the family firm, they trigger 
changes in the governance structure to regulate negative consequences in the future. First, 
characteristics of an RES are introduced, such as clear roles and responsibilities, contractual 
agreements and reciprocity at the business level (Long & Mathews, 2011). Further, monitoring 
and control mechanisms, such as a board of directors, are likely to be installed (Siebels & zu 
Knyphausen‐Aufseß, 2012). Second, preventive measures aim at goal alignment, taking the form 
of ownership transfer or share packages tied to organizational goals (Madison et al., 2016). Hence, 
we see a shift from stewardship to agency governance structure in the family firm over time – 
triggered by factors that have altered the relationship between the owner and the family manager 
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(Long, 2011). Conversely, in the second situation, the lack of asymmetric altruism, workplace 
deviance and patriarchy would further strengthen the steward-like mechanisms, granting goal 
alignment and the prioritization of family business interests before the manager’s personal ones. 
In light of the foregoing, we advance the following propositions to capture our arguments: 
1a) Asymmetric altruism, workplace deviance, and patriarchy determine a shift from a 
generalized exchange system toward a restricted exchange system characterizing the 
owner–family manager relationship. 
1b) The lack of asymmetric altruism, workplace deviance, and patriarchy strengthens a 
generalized exchange system characterizing the owner–family manager relationship. 
 
2a) The altered owner–family manager relationship triggers the change from stewardship-
oriented to agency-oriented governance in the family firm. 
2b) The strengthened owner–family manager relationship triggers the reinforcement of 
stewardship-oriented governance in the family firm. 
 
 
3.2 Scenario 2: the nonfamily manager 
The second scenario we analyze is the case of an owner-founder who decides to hire a nonfamily 
manager to take on his management position in the company. Ownership remains with the founder, 
who is planning transgenerational control (Chua et al., 1999). 
Setup phase: An RES characterizes the owner’s relationship to his nonfamily manager 
based on direct reciprocity, self-interest, contractual agreements and market ethics (Long & 
Mathews, 2011). We assume a self-serving nonfamily manager, as he has no ownership or 
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psychological ownership of the firm. Hence, his goals must be aligned top-down with those of the 
family firm and its owner (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Further, the owner must control his actions 
to ensure they serve the firm’s best interest (Jaskiewicz, Block, Combs, & Miller, 2017). Thus, the 
owner designs an agency governance structure that aims at inducing a pro-organizational attitude 
and accordingly pro-organizational behaviors in the nonfamily manager (James et al., 2017). 
Family principals, indeed, are not only concerned with increasing firm performance and value but 
also with socioemotional factors such as identification with the family and its values (Jaskiewicz 
et al., 2017). We assume that at first both parties agree to this governance structure, although the 
nonfamily manager might feel resentment if he is naturally a steward (James et al., 2017). 
Action phase: In this scenario, we also consider command, connections and continuity 
dimensions, looking in particular at pro-organizational behavior, relationship building, especially 
with the owning family, and long-term commitment. Time becomes a key aspect at this point, as 
pro-organizational behavior and relationship building will not immediately alter the governance 
structure, and long-term commitment can only be proven over time. Such behaviors must be 
present over an extended time period to build trust between the owner and nonfamily manager. 
Hence, we find trust to be the underlying mechanism in all three factors. As opposed to our first 
scenario, here the change factors only originate in the nonfamily manager and must be actively 
signaled to the owner. Pro-organizational behavior captures positive behavioral traits of 
employees toward their organization, thus describing a positive work ethic aiming at employee 
cooperation, empowerment and motivation (Davis et al., 1997). At the organizational level, such 
behavior is achieved by strong role models in a management characterized by an involvement-
oriented and collectivistic culture. The nonfamily manager in this scenario embraces such a 
management style. He strongly identifies with the family firm and its values and does not engage 
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in self-serving activities potentially damaging to the family firm (Madison et al., 2016). Building 
on this pro-organizational behavior, relationship building within the organization is an integral 
part of the pro-organizational management style. However, relationship building with the owner 
is a key aspect and has the power to change the governance structure over time (Blumentritt, Keyt, 
& Astrachan, 2007). In this second scenario, the owner naturally has reservations toward the 
nonfamily manager, considered an outsider (Madison et al., 2016). Thus, the manager must 
actively signal his willingness to internalize the family’s values and align his personal goals with 
those of the firm. Only through proactive signaling over an extended period of time can the owner 
build up trust. Signals include close communication, involvement in decision-making processes, 
willingness to learn from the owner-founder, a genuine interest in understanding the family’s 
values and vision for the firm, and espousing a transgenerational strategy (Blumentritt et al., 2007). 
The last trigger is the long-term commitment of the manager, which is contingent on the 
other two change factors. Nonetheless, the resulting behavioral traits and their effects on the 
owner-manager relationship are discussed separately here. To signal long-term commitment, a 
nonfamily manager must internalize both the family firm’s and the family’s goals. Only when he 
fully refrains from self-serving behaviors, commonly observed in nonfamily managers (James et 
al., 2017), can the relationship shift toward a GES over time.  
However, any event that would disable managers from implementing pro-organizational 
behaviors and undermine trust and long-term commitment would make RES continuously 
characterize the relationship between managers and owners.  
Change phase: Whether a movement toward a GES and thus a change toward stewardship-
oriented governance is possible depends primarily on the capability and openness of the owner to 
develop trust in the nonfamily manager. We expect the owner to have natural reservations toward 
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the nonfamily manager (James et al., 2017). To counteract these reservations, the nonfamily 
manager must engage in active signaling over an extended period of time. Problematic in this 
setting is the existing agency governance structure installed upon the entry of the nonfamily 
manager, counteracting the steward-like behavior of the nonfamily manager (Madison et al., 
2016). Control mechanisms and strictly contractually agreed-upon processes are likely to reduce 
motivation among stewards and create resentment (James et al., 2017). If the nonfamily manager 
is able to preserve his steward-like behavior traits and make the owner aware of his pro-
organizational behavior and long-term commitment, the owner might allow relationship building 
in order to instill family values in the nonfamily manager. During this process, the RES will rather 
automatically shift to GES characteristics, in turn creating a tension with existing governance 
mechanisms. The control mechanisms are now perceived as dispensable and external goal 
alignment efforts, such as large bonus payments, become obsolete. Hence, we see a change in the 
governance structure over time from an agency-oriented to a stewardship-oriented governance 
structure. Conversely, when managers do not exhibit pro-organizational behavior and long-term 
commitment and are unable to build a trusting relationship over time, the type of relationship 
would still resemble an RES and the owners would further install an agency-oriented governance 
structure, increasing control and monitoring mechanisms to ensure that managers do not exploit 
their powerful position.  
 
From these situations, we advance the following propositions to capture our arguments. 
3a) Pro-organizational behavior, relationship building, and long-term commitment 
determine a shift from a restricted exchange system toward a generalized exchange system 
characterizing the owner–nonfamily manager relationship. 
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3b) Lack of pro-organizational behavior, relationship building, and long-term 
commitment strengthens a restricted exchange system characterizing the owner–
nonfamily manager relationship. 
 
4a) The altered owner–nonfamily manager relationship triggers the change from agency-
oriented to stewardship-oriented governance in the family firm. 
4b) The strengthened owner–nonfamily manager relationship triggers the reinforcement 
of agency-oriented governance in the family firm. 
 
3.3 A conceptual model for governance structure changes in family firms 
Based on the literature review on agency and stewardship theory in family firms and the analysis 
of the two scenarios presented above, we identified change factors that alter the owner-manager 
relationship as well as the corresponding governance structure. The two scenarios distinguish 
between the relationship between the owner-founder with either a family (stewardship governance 
in the setup phase) or a nonfamily manager (agency governance in the setup phase). Relying on 
and adapting the 4C model by Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005), we argue that these opposing 
governance structures stem from the different exchange systems – RES versus GES – the 
relationships are based on. This initial governance structure is determined in Phase 1 of our model 
(Figure 1). In the consecutive Phase 2, we argue that several change factors trigger behaviors in 
the actors that alter their relationship over time.  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Insert Figure 1  




As a result of their changed relationship, the governance structure will be adapted accordingly in 
Phase 3. The theoretical model condenses the propositions from each scenario and contextualizes 
them in a holistic view of governance mechanisms in owner-manager relationships in family firms.  
 
4. Discussion 
Our paper aims to close the gap in the literature relating to the changes in governance structures 
and managers’ behavior in family firms. The literature has focused thus far on explaining which 
theory, stewardship or agency, is more likely to explain manager behaviors and determine the most 
beneficial governance approach for the firm (James et al., 2017). This is rooted in the evolution of 
the application of both agency and stewardship theory to family business, in an attempt to develop 
a theory of the family firm. However, in both cases, scholars have neglected to take into account 
how the owner-manager relationship changes over time. In particular, in the context of family 
firms with management tenures of up to 35 years, it is crucial to acknowledge the effects of time 
on relationships (Le Breton‐Miller & Miller, 2006; Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011). The traditional 
assumption that nonfamily managers need an agency-oriented governance structure to align their 
interests and protect the family firm from their self-serving interests is long outdated (James et al., 
2017). Family managers represent a source of nontraditional agency problems (Schulze et al., 
2001), while nonfamily managers may behave pro-organizationally despite being external to the 
family (Davis et al., 2010). Challenging the static view of governance structures (Lubatkin et al., 
2007) enables one not only to introduce temporal considerations into the debate on family firm 
governance (Sharma et al., 2014) but also to develop a model of change that reconciles the 
discussion surrounding which governance structure is more beneficial. 
 
4.1 Theoretical contributions 
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The model presented in this article, first of all, lays the groundwork for researching changes in 
governance structures in family firms. To study the owner-manager relationship through SET, we 
leverage the characteristics of the two opposing exchange systems, namely, restricted and 
generalized (Daspit et al., 2016). We create a setting in which the evolution of the owner-manager 
relationship can be examined over time (Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011). The findings of this analysis 
comprise change factors that trigger either a shift from an agency to a stewardship-oriented 
governance and vice versa, or a reinforcement of the existing governance structure (e.g., Madison 
et al., 2016). Thus, our theoretical model offers novel insights into evolving managerial behavior 
and governance structure, which in turn provide a basis for designing empirical research in this 
field. In sum, we launch a debate about why and how governance structures change over time in 
family firms.  
Second, we enhance recent efforts to determine the most suitable governance mechanisms 
for family firms by theorizing that it depends not only on the origin of the manager (family or 
nonfamily) but on the underlying relationship between owner and manager. Our article calls for 
redirecting research efforts toward an analysis of the relationships among the actors involved and 
their effect on governance structures (James et al., 2017). For this purpose, we rely on the 4C 
model (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005) and suggest, in particular, that the command, connections 
and continuity dimensions influence changes in the exchange systems characterizing owner-
manager relationships, which in turn affect the change in or reinforcement of the governance in 
place in the organization. This explains how the family business can shape the community 
dimension, considering to what extent the family nurtures, via a specific governance structure, a 




Third, we introduce the time component into the debate on governance structures. Time 
plays a particularly relevant role in family firms, given their transgenerational intentions (Chua et 
al., 1999). Thus, research must think across generations to consider the potential impact of time in 
all its facets (Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011; Sharma et al., 2014). Moreover, acknowledging that 
governance structures are subject to change contributes to the debate on bifurcation bias (Verbeke 
& Kano, 2012), as family and nonfamily members may perceive a different treatment at first, 
although this perception might change over time, given that it depends on “whose shoes you are 
in or think you are in” (Carsrud, 2006, p. 859). Hence, we claim that family affiliation might only 
be a minor indicator of the governance structure in family firms, whereas the relationship is the 
actual key to deterring it.  
 
4.2 Practical contributions 
Despite its conceptual nature, our research also offers implications for practice. Family firm 
principals must be alert to the need to adapt their businesses’ governance structure to cope with 
the actual relationships in place. In the case of deviant family managers, they must not be 
blindsided by their family affiliation, but adapt the governance structure to meet the needs of the 
family firm. Nontraditional agency problems can be a larger threat than traditional agency 
problems, as the former often go unnoticed for an extended time period. In the case of a nonfamily 
manager, family shareholders should be open to refraining from strict control mechanisms when 
the nonfamily manager is signaling a strong affiliation to family goals and pro-organizational 
behaviors. Shifting toward a stewardship-oriented governance structure is beneficial to all 
stakeholders and especially to the family firm.  
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 However, managers might also behave in the same way over time, thus strengthening the 
type of exchange system characterizing the owner-manager relationship. Family shareholders must 
be ready to further motivate family managers who truly behave as stewards of the business and to 
increase the control and monitoring systems entailed by an agency-oriented governance structure. 
 
4.3 Future research opportunities 
Our conceptual research offers several future directions, especially related to governance 
structures as subject to change over time. Research may leverage the triggers of change identified 
in this paper to test our theoretical model within an empirical setting. Moreover, we have limited 
our analysis to three factors in each scenario. Although we have thoroughly chosen them from 
proven concepts in the literature, we believe that future research should extend our proposed list 
and examine the influence of additional factors such as multigenerational involvement, prior 
experiences of owner and manager, or mixed management teams, to name only a few. Furthermore, 
our scenarios both result from the first management succession (owner-founder as principal), 
which has offered a simplified setting in which to develop the proposed model and advance our 
propositions. Nonetheless, we excluded aspects that could further enrich the debate and potentially 
alter our results. In particular, the role of later generations (Sharma et al., 2003), involvement of 
several family members (Schulze et al., 2003a), ownership structure and experiences of previous 
succession processes play a crucial role in determining the most suitable governance structure in 
a family firm (Cater & Kidwell, 2014). 
i In order to improve readability, only the male form is used in this document. Nevertheless, we refer to both genders 
equally. 
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Figure 1: A conceptual model for the change in exchange systems (RES/GES) and governance structures (agency- or stewardship-
oriented) in family firms.  
 
 
 
 
